The 'varieties of capitalism' approach offers key insights into the institutional embeddedness of economic experiences. It performs an important function in providing a conceptual framework for empirical analyses of the way in which the economy both manifests, and itself is a manifestation of, a whole series of different experiences. However, I argue that the Ricardian themes evident in Hall and Soskice's Varieties of Capitalism limit the potential effectiveness of the empirical analyses that the approach makes possible. Within the context of this latent Ricardianism, the economy is understood to be international, and the important differences within the economic system are those between different national 'models'.
Introduction
There is much to commend in the 'varieties of capitalism' approach as pioneered by Peter Hall and David Soskice. Analytically, it provides us with a means of framing the most important questions of contemporary political economy beyond the popular association of globalisation with an institutional monoculture for the regulation of economic affairs. Normatively, it releases us from the political fatalism of the presumed neoliberal logic of no alternative that so frequently accompanies the prior assertion of truly global economic conditions. Indeed, it allows us to transcend altogether the tendential reification of 'the international' as a discrete spatial scale of economic activity. The 'varieties of capitalism' approach negates the temptation to try to construct truly systemic explanations of capitalist development.
For each of these reasons, the contribution that the 'varieties of capitalism' approach makes to our understanding of the economy is considerable. As such, it would be unnecessarily churlish to use the pages that follow to question the overall usefulness of that approach. I do not seek to challenge the ends of Hall and Soskice's work, whereby they present to us a world in which alternative social bases of organising capitalist economies freely co-exist. My critique is limited to the means through which they present such a world. In particular, I question the utility of the Ricardian themes that are evident in the 'varieties of capitalism' approach. 1 1 I maintain that a latent Ricardianism is evident throughout the Hall and Soskice approach due to the explanatory significance that is attached to the concept of comparative advantage, despite there being no reference to Ricardo's published work in the bibliography of Varieties of Capitalism.
While accepting the empirical fact that contemporary capitalism sustains a variety of economic experiences, I argue that the appeal to Ricardian ideas of specialisation, trade and comparative advantage is not the most effective way of explaining the existence of such variety.
Reifying 'the National' in Ricardian Theory
The 'varieties of capitalism' approach offers much in its ability to move us beyond the tendential reification of 'the international' as a discrete spatial scale of economic activity. It reminds us that there are particular geographies of production and consumption, which represent embedded networks of economic activity that are limited both socially and spatially. Spatial scales become more than arbitrary territorial distinctions only at those moments in which they have social significance conferred upon them by way of the human interactions that take place at those scales.
From our own experiences of the world, we know that most of the economic relations in which we engage occur at spatial scales other than 'the international'. However, there is a danger, evident in much of the comparative political economy literature on national 'models' of capitalism, of responding to this observation simply by replacing one reified spatial scale with another. The fact that the majority of economic activity is not conducted at the international level does not, as a consequence, obviate the need to think outside the terms of discrete and autonomously constituted national economies. It remains unclear whether such a task is possible within an analytical framework that allows each country to possess its own national variant of capitalism. This is not to accuse Hall and Soskice directly of restricting their analysis solely to that of discrete and autonomously constituted national economies. Yet, it is noticeable within much of the comparative political economy literature, which operationalises their conceptual ideal-types of liberal market and co-ordinated market capitalism, that each national economy tends to be treated as a separate variant of one of the two ideal-types. The distinctiveness of each national 'model' is assumed to reflect differences between the institutional organisation of its economy and that of the ideal-type it most closely resembles. If Hall and Soskice cannot be accused directly of restricting their analysis to that of autonomously constituted national economies, their mode of thinking has allowed those who have attempted empirically to operationalise its core claims to overplay such autonomy.
This tendency has taken three forms. Firstly, in the hands of some, all of the separate national 'models' of capitalism come to be treated as ideal-types in their own rightor, at the very least, as ideal-subtypes (e.g., we hear frequent references to the German Model, the Swedish Model, etc). Secondly, in the hands of others, different levels of abstraction are conflated, with claims relating to the conceptual ideal-subtypes being presented as a valid description of the institutional features of the economy in question (e.g., the debate about the continued existence of the Swedish Model tends to contrast current conditions in Sweden with an ideal-type that is assumed to approximate past conditions). Thirdly, comparisons across country cases are less common than contrasts between them (e.g., it is more usual to focus on institutional specificities that lead to distinctive experiences in one country than it is to focus on institutional similarities that lead to common experiences in a range of countries -see Strange 1997: 183) .
I attribute this tendency to the economic model which is implicit in the 'varieties of capitalism' approach. Despite there being no explicit recognition of the fact in the work of Hall and Soskice, the 'varieties of capitalism' approach is unmistakably Ricardian in the language, image and intuitive appeal of its core conceptualisations. It seeks to explain "the institutional foundations of comparative advantage" 2 and, in common with Ricardo's reflections on that theme, it does so through reference to the dynamics of specialisation and trade.
Ricardo's classic model of international trade is built upon the assumption of a two economy/two good world, in which the economies are closed at the point of production but open at the point of exchange (see Ricardo 1891 Ricardo [1911 : 77-93).
Trade is assumed to take place only after each economy has specialised its production in one good at the expense of production in the other.
The question of who produces what is reduced to that of the relative efficiency of the input of labour into the production process (Sraffa 1951) , where the social basis of labour productivity remains unexplored. The social relations of production are something of a black box in Ricardian accounts of the economy, as economic causality is situated at the level of exchange rather than that of production. This is significant for an appraisal of the 'varieties of capitalism' approach as it embodies so many Ricardian themes, and it is a point to which I return in my concluding comments. For now, however, I will continue with the current line of argument. For, the limitations of Ricardian analysis quite clearly feed through into the 'varieties of capitalism' approach in a number of other ways.
The Ricardian model of international trade operates on the assumption that the geographical limits of factor mobility correspond perfectly to the territorial limits of the national economy (see, for instance, Backhouse 1994:77; Blaug 1996: 118) . Land is clearly fixed geographically, and the history of international politics has served to ensure that we conventionally think of the territorial division of land into socio-legal entities called nation states. However, the same assumption is also made in terms of labour and capital. Within such a schema, the only way in which we can expect trade to take place is through specialisation and the subsequent increase in economic welfare that accrues from the mutual exchange of goods made within specialist production regimes.
Specialisation is thus the logical corollary of comparative advantage. Yet, it also implies the existence of discrete and independently formed national economies. In the absence of such economies it would be impossible to talk about specialisation.
For Ricardians, specialisation requires the subsequent institutionalisation of differences in the structure of national economies just as surely as, for Ricardo himself, it required the prior existence of comparative advantage within the production regime (Ricardo 1819 (Ricardo [1911 : 81). In this way, Ricardian analysis, which is founded upon the assumption of specialisation and trade, reifies 'the national' in our study of economic processes. This is significant, for it allows those that have followed in the Ricardian tradition of the 'varieties of capitalism' approach to focus primarily on the institutional specificities of differentiated growth trajectories across the capitalist world (see, for example, Goldthorpe 1984; Berger and Dore 1996; Kitschelt et al 1999) . This is not to say that such studies are unwarranted. 3 The problem, however, is when this leads to the elision of two different arguments that exist at two very different levels of abstraction. The empirical analysis of the experience of institutional specificities is all too often conflated with conceptual claims about the existence of distinct national 'models' of capitalism. Indeed, the issue may be even more serious than this.
Conceptual claims about the existence of distinct national capitalisms are often treated as if they were empirical analyses of actual economic experiences. In this way, the significance of institutional differences at the level of the national economy are frequently asserted, 4 rather than being suggested as a hypothesis awaiting empirical in which a range of purely hypothetical models are established, typically with little regard for the models' applicability to the real world (Hollander 1979) . The simplifying assumption is usually taken to be Ricardo's trademark (Peach 1993) , along with a tendency to package the world into a series of mutually exclusive abstract categories (Schumpeter 1954 ).
Ricardo's world is an 'either/or' world, in which an economy displays either one set of characteristics or another. It is this mode of thinking that allowed him to distinguish quite so clearly between one set of abstract characteristics that he took to be representative of the 'English' economy and another that he took to be representative of the 'Portuguese' economy. It is also this mode of thinking that allowed him to construct his theory of comparative advantage on the basis of such distinctions. Ricardo himself did not use the language of the English or the Portuguese 'model' in an attempt to render his abstractions ostensibly more concrete by presenting them as a short-hand description of actually existing economic conditions relating to the world production of cloth and wine (Ricardo 1819 (Ricardo [1991 : ).
Yet, the same style of analysis, which seeks to emphasise national specificities within the world production regime on the basis of comparative advantage, is evident within the 'varieties of capitalism' approach. Moreover, within the terms of this latter approach, the appeal to distinct national 'models' is made as a matter of routine. I turn in the following section to investigate the extent to which the existence of such 'models' is confirmed within the empirical data.
Specialisation, Trade and Comparative Advantage in Practice
The tendency to prioritise conceptual abstractions at the expense of empirical indicators is, without doubt, the most frequently documented drawback of the Ricardian tradition of political economy. In Schumpeter's caustic phrase, the habit of applying highly simplified abstractions to the solution of practical problems is the 'Ricardian vice' that has compromised economists' thinking since the methodological conversion that followed the publication of Ricardo's Principles (Schumpeter 1954) .
Nowhere is this more apparent than in Ricardo's own work on comparative advantage.
Ricardo's purported explanation of patterns of specialisation within the English and
Portuguese economies is not really that at all. At most, it is an explanation of how such patterns would arise were they to reflect nothing other than a simple economic logic. As more recent historical scholarship has shown, the seventeenth century division of labour between English cloth-making and Portuguese wine-making is more readily explained by intra-European alliance building and, in particular, Portuguese attempts to guarantee British protection from Spain (Magdoff 1978) . The concessionary trade agreements that ensued allowed Britain to exploit the gold reserves of Portuguese colonies, especially those of Brazil. The subsequent influx of capital flows into Britain was used to enhance existing productivity levels in technologically dynamic industries such as cloth-making, while the political recompense for increasing dependence on Britain was to favour Portuguese wine imports over French (McIntyre 1999: 248-9 ).
Comparative advantage is 'that to be explained' (the explanandum), rather than 'that doing the explaining' (the explanans). It is not some pre-given property of the economic system, so much as the contingent outcome of a series of social and political forces, which are likely to be historically limited to a particular moment of another, so that the final stage of the production process takes place in the country in which the product is to be sold.
To offer some indication of the scale of such activities, intra-firm trade involving US multinationals equates to around one-third of all American cross-border trade (Wade 1996: 64) . On the basis of this finding alone, it is possible to argue that production has become more sensitive to an international division of labour (Barff 1995) . Given the existence of appropriate economies of scale, the labour-intensive parts of the production process tend to be located where labour costs are low, while the capitalintensive parts of the production process tend to be located where suitable skills are in ready supply, irrespective of their cost. However, such dynamics cannot be understood within Ricardian models of comparative advantage, as such models are based on the assumption that capital is immobile across countries (see, for instance, Backhouse 1994:77; Blaug 1996: 118) .
So, given these two major qualifications, is there any empirical basis on which to shows that the extent of trade between an exporting and an importing country is exactly equal to the importing country's percentage share of all eighteen countries' import sectors. A score above 100 shows that a more than proportional amount of trade takes place between the exporting and the importing country; a score below 100
shows that a less than proportional amount of trade takes place between the two countries.
The timeframe for the data points was chosen deliberately in order to increase the proportionately more with countries that are institutionally similar than with countries that are institutionally dissimilar. That is, they trade proportionately more with countries whose institutional frameworks do not provide the basis for distinct patterns of economic specialisation than those that do.
Only the conservative regime cluster fails to entirely contradict the predictions of the Ricardian approach to comparative institutional advantage, and then only partially so.
As diagram 4 indicates, trade is not as concentrated within the conservative cluster as it is within the liberal and the social democratic clusters. Indeed, inter-cluster trade from the conservative to the social democratic cluster is more pronounced than intracluster trade within the conservative cluster. However, this pattern of trading, which at least partially conforms to the assumption that there are institutional foundations of comparative advantage, is not replicated in the trading relations between the conservative and the liberal clusters. in Ricardian accounts of the economy, all causality is situated at the level of exchange rather than that of production, thus rendering discussion of the social relations of production superfluous to the analysis.
Yet, it is from the position that people occupy within the social relations of production that is the foremost influence shaping their experience of capitalism, not the country in which they live. Let us be clear that a single national 'model' of capitalism sustains a whole range of different experiences of the economy, depending upon the way in which different people are socialised into the economy, as well as being socialised into expecting to perform particular types of economic roles. Thus, the difference between being, for instance, a protected or an unprotected worker, university or non-university educated, employed in new economy or old economy sectors, in manufacturing, finance, agriculture or the service sector, matters at least as much to the experience of the economy as where in the advanced industrialised world that experience takes place.
Such differences are obscured by the way in which the 'national' spatial scale is reified within Ricardian theory. The 'varieties of capitalism' approach is limited by the extent to which its focus on national 'models' of capitalism allows fundamental features of the social structure of accumulation -e.g., those activated along the lines of class, race and gender differences -to remain unexplored. The task that lies ahead is to find alternative conceptual foundations for the 'varieties of capitalism' approach that enable such features to be integrated into the analysis. Formula for calculating individual data points = 100(Xy→x + My→x) / (Xy(total) + My(total)) x 100 ────────────────────────────────────────────── 100(Xx(total) + Mx(total)) / Σ (Xx1(total)→Xx18(total) + Mx1(total)→Mx18(total)) Where: i) the numerator equals the percentage of a particular country's trade -exports plus imports -with another country; ii) the denominator equals the size of that latter country's traded sector -incoming plus outgoingexpressed as a percentage of the sum of all 18 countries' traded sectors, thereby controlling for the effects of differences in the relative size of different countries' traded sectors; iii) all figures are weighted by being multiplied by 100 -thus, a recorded figure of 100 represents direct proportionality between the extent of trade between one country and another (expressed as a percentage of the former's overall traded sector) and the latter's percentage share of all 18 countries' traded sectors. 
